Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 13
Issue 2 Spring 2004

Article 4

Judicial Reaction to Change: The California
Supreme Court around the 1986 Elections
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L. (2004) "Judicial Reaction to Change: The California Supreme Court around the 1986 Elections," Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol13/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

JUDICIAL REACTION TO CHANGE:
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
AROUND THE 1986 ELECTIONS
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulost
INTRODUCTION .............................................
I. THE BACKDROP FOR THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS OF 1986 .................................
II. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN 1984 AND 1989 ...........
A. JUSTICE BROUSSARD ................................
B. JUSTICE M OSK .....................................
C.

405
408
416
417
421

JUSTICE LUCAS ....................................... 424

III. JUDICIAL TENURES .................................
CONCLUSION: IMPOSSIBLE EVALUATIONS? ..............

426
429

INTRODUCTION
Are the decision-making methods of sitting judges susceptible to
changes in their environment? California residents removed three of the
seven justices of its Supreme Court in 1986 in a popular vote because
they would not affirm death penalties.' After the appointment of replacement justices, the court's approach to the death penalty changed
dramatically. 2 But three justices who sat in the court before the election
remained on the court afterwards. They provide an interesting opportunity to study judicial behavior when a significant change in the composit Professor of Law and John S. Grimes Fellow, Indiana University School of LawIndianapolis. I wish to thank a source who requests anonymity, Mark Ramseyer and the participants in the 1999 Olin Conference on the Economic Analysis of the Judiciary at Harvard
Law School f ir invaluable comments. This paper benefited greatly from the valiant assistance of Faith Long Knotts, Susan Butz, and the work of the editorial team of the Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy.
I This is, of course, an event of monumental significance in state law judicial history
and in the operation of the California Constitution that is receiving increasing attention from
commentators. See generally JOSEPH R. GRODIN, In Pursuit of Justice; John H. Culver &
Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and Death: Capital Punishment As Public Policy in
California, 65 ALB. L. REv. 991 (2002); John H. Culver, The Transformationof the California
Supreme Court: 1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1461 (1998); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and JudicialMethod: A Retrospective on the CaliforniaRetention Election
of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988). For a more "macro" view of state courts, as they
react to the polity's views about abortion, see generally Paul Brace et al., JudicialChoice and
the Politics of Abortion: Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REv.
1265 (1999).
2 See infra Figure 1 and accompanying text.

405

406

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 13:405

tion of a court occurs. While statistical studies of judicial decisions are
legion, this author is aware of no case study that tracks the change of
judicial voting and legal strategies surrounding a change of such magnitude. The votes of each regular justice on the California Supreme Court
on cases involving the death penalty allow this study of changes in the
attitudes of the justices who remained after the change in the court's
composition. To avoid election-year interference and the disturbances
that might exist immediately following a change in the court, this article
studies judicial decision-making in 1984-1985 and 1989 cases where the
Supreme Court of California reviewed lower court decisions imposing
the death penalty. Three justices survived the 1986 election and were on
the court at both times. Each of these justices changed their voting customs on death penalty cases.
Statistical analyses of judicial decisions forms so vast and growing a
collection that a recent review took 17 pages to describe it. 3 That evidence overwhelmingly shows that party affiliation of the appointing political figure-and, by extension, of the judge-influences judicial votes.
That evidence, however, focuses largely on federal judges, the life tenure
of which may influence the results. 4 Other work has examined judicial
citation practices. 5 The incentives judges face have also been the object
of scholarship. 6 To reinforce the resulting presumption that judges are
3 Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 832-50 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155
(1998); Richard L. Revesz. CongressionalInfluence on Judicial Behavior?: an EmpiricalExamination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100 (2001);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts:
Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685
(2000).
5 The Chicago-Kent Law Review periodically holds symposia volumes on the citation
patterns to law review articles and some contributions do compare judicial citation practices.
See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly JournalsCite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 871 (1996). Other
works also study the citation practices of judges. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZo: A
STUDY IN REPUTATION, 88-90 (1990); WILLIAM M. LANDES FT AL., JudicialInfluence: A Citation Analysis of FederalCourts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998) (using the
citations of published opinions of federal court of appeals judges to estimate the influence of
individual judges); William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002) (comparing the use of authority by the Supreme Court to the authorities cited in the briefs submitted to the Court); John H. Merryman,
Toward a Theory of Citations: an Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 414-22 (1977); Richard A.
Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J.
511, 534-40 (1994) (studying the citations of Learned Hand).
6 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-44 (1996) (with further cita-

tions); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does - Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities FraudOpinions, 51 EMORY
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unlikely to disregard incentives, the evidence also shows retaliation
against judges by the executive power. 7 Sitting judges have bitterly disputed the statistics questioning the impartiality of judges. 8 Because this
evidence comes predominantly from life-tenured judges, the question of

how elected judges react to the threat of retaliation by a state electorate
remains unanswered. The 1986 California elections offer the opportunity
to observe the response of judges to a clear change. This article studies
voting in two periods: before and after the elections. The background
issue can be framed as one of consistency: Is each judge's voting pattern
consistent between the two periods?
This article's review of judicial voting practices reveals three inconsistencies which relate to personal preferences, the law, and political
party affiliation. Voting patterns are inconsistent with personal preferences because the patterns change. 9 They are inconsistent with the law
because their change does not match the change of the law.' 0 They are
inconsistent with political party affiliation because they change when the
parties' positions do not." The votes are a small component of larger,
more complex judicial strategies.
Because this article is a case study rather than a statistical analysis
of a large sample, it allows a detailed look at the likely strategies underlying each justice's votes. The inconsistency with an explanation based
on political affiliation shows that statistical validations of strategic voting, while possible, are unlikely. Therefore, statistical tests will tend to
fail to find evidence of strategic voting.
L.J. 83 (2002) (studying the use of heuristics in securities law opinions); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000) (comparing the judicial incentives produced by the civil law model of career
judges to the common law system where judgeships recognize and reward a complete previous
legal career).
7 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law
Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 3 J. L. EcON. & ORG. 259 (1997) (studying executive
influence over the Japanese judiciary); J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Why is the
Japanese Conviction Rate so High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001); see also J. Mark Ramseyer,
The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721
(1994).
8 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegialityand Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84
VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998) (discussing the role of judicial collegiality in decision making);
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1999) (questioning
a proposal to appoint judges based on the President's political affiliation); Patricia M. Wald,
Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173, 179-82 (1992).
9 See text accompanying note 48 for Justice Broussard. For Justice Lucas, see text
accompanying notes 83-97.
10 The leading example is Justice Mosk, who cast a smaller proportion of votes to affirm
the imposition of the death penalty after the elections. Justice Lucas' last ten affirming votes
in 1985 ignored precedent, see infra text accompanying note 91.
11 See infra, text accompanying note 52.
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The circumstances of the 1986 elections are unusual. The 1986 California elections were a crucial development in the possibility of the
United States curtailing the use of the death penalty. Not only were these
elections an extraordinary event for death penalty jurisprudence, they
were also a demonstration of an unusual institutional practice-the removal of sitting justices in direct, judicial elections. A study of an exercise of the electorate's power through the unusual institution of judicial
elections would be remiss not to attempt to assist their evaluation as an
institution in the context of modern democratic systems.
California Supreme Court decisions in the years since the 1986 election allow the examination of the tenures of the justices appointed in the
shadow of the 1986 elections, which were unusually short.' 2 This is a
potentially crucial secondary effect of the conflict over the death penalty
and the method by which it was resolved.
Part I describes briefly the events in California leading up to the
1986 judicial elections and the sample for this case study. Part II applies
statistical tests. Part III compares judicial tenures before and after the
death-penalty conflict.
I.

THE BACKDROP FOR THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS OF 1986

Justices of the California Supreme Court are subject to unopposed
retention elections.' 3 Retention elections are the product of a conservative movement at the first part of the twentieth century that feared populism.14 These elections were designed to remove the base side of politics
from the process of electing the judiciary. Ironically, conservative forces
had to overcome the pro-incumbent bias of retention elections in 1986 to
remove, for the first and only time in California history, 15 three justices
who were considered "soft" on crime. The Supreme Court was accused
of countering the electorate's desire for the imposition of the death pen6
alty that had been expressed in repeatedly successful referenda.'
The electoral cycle of California Justices is unusual. Nominally, the
term of California justices is 12 years, but beginning the 12-year cycle
may require up to two elections. Immediately after the justice's appointment by the Governor, the justice must stand for election at the next
general election. Upon winning that election, the justice steps into the
predecessor's 12-year cycle, so that if the predecessor would have been
12 See infra text accompanying notes 100-101.
13 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
14 GRODIN, supra note 1, at 164-66 (discussing how California adopted the retention
election system in 1934).
15 Id. at 166 (noting that no justice has been removed since then either).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
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up for reelection in less than 12 years, the newly appointed, and elected,
7
justice must stand for re-election at that time as well.' While the maximum of two elections may be necessary before a justice is into the
twelve-year cycle, if the justice's appointment occurs immediately before
the predecessor would have been up for reelection, that single vote will
approve the appointment and start the twelve year cycle. Thereafter, the
previous justice's 12-year cycle continues. Accordingly, not all judges
are up for re-election at every general election, neither is the number of
justices that will be up for election fixed, but rather it depends on recent
appointments.
Death penalty law has attracted voluminous commentary. Briefly,
in 1972 the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty violated
the California Constitution's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause in
People v. Anderson,'8 which was overruled by initiative in the next election.1 9 That same year, the United States Supreme Court held unconsti20
A narrow and fractured
tutional all existing death penalty statutes.
juries in imposing the
of
discretion
unguided
majority objected to the
death penalty. Furman inflamed the public opinion. The approval of
capital punishment, which in polls was at 50% in the summer of 1972,
jumped to 57%, and within a year nineteen states had passed new death
21
The reacpenalty statutes, soon to be followed by sixteen more states.
two popand
tion of the California polity included two statutory schemes
ular votes-Proposition 17 in the 1972 elections restoring the
constitutionality of the death penalty and the "Briggs" initiative in 1978
which produced a stricter capital punishment regime than the legislative
proposition. 22 The United States Supreme Court approved the death pen23
alty statutes that sought to guide juror discretion in Gregg v. Georgia,

17 CAL. Const. art. VI, § 16(a) ("[T]erms are 12 years beginning the Monday after January 1 following their election, except that a judge elected to an unexpired term serves the
remainder of the term.").
18 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
19 Proposition 17, amending Article I, § 27, reads:
The death penalty provided for under [existing death-penalty] statutes shall not be
deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within
the meaning of Article 1, Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be
deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.
Proposed Amendments to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws, General Election,
Nov. 7, 1972, Part II - app. at 21.
20 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
21

EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS:

THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE

Epic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 111 (1999).

22 See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem
for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1307-10 (1997).
23 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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and eventually also approved aspects of California's scheme in Tuilaepa
24

v. California.

The principal target of the popular movement favoring death penalties was Chief Justice Rose E. Bird. In the 1978 elections she was confirmed with a bare majority, under 52%, the narrowest majority on
record at that time.2 5 These same elections produced the "Briggs" death
penalty initiative. 26 In 1986 the electorate removed Justice Bird along
with Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso, apparently because of
their leniency on crime.
California death penalty appeals have an attractive feature for their
quantitative study. Settlements and non-prosecutions terminate ordinary
disputes without a court opinion. The study of court opinions about such
disputes is hampered by "selection bias," the phenomenon that the observed opinions are missing the disputes that were settled or dropped.
24 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
25 GRODIN, supra note 1, at 168.
26 The "Briggs death penalty initiative" took effect the day after the elections of November 7, 1978. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d 1001, 1025 (1989). It amended Cal.
Penal Code § 190.2 to define the special circumstances of murder that cause it to be punishable by life imprisonment without parole or by death. Section 190.2 read as follows until 1989:
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be
death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of
parole in any case in which one or more the following special circumstances has
been charged and specially found . . . to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of murder in the first or second
degree....
(3) The defendant has, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one
offense of murder in the first or second degree....
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity....
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion,
nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an
accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of,
immediate flight
after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: (i) Robbery ... ;
(ii) Kidnapping . . .; (iii) Rape.. (vii) Burglary .. . ; (viii) Arson . . .; (x)
Mayhem ....

(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture ....
(b) Every person ... intentionally aiding, abetting ....
or assisting any actor in the
commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confinement in state
prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in any case in which one or
more of the special circumstances [are found true] ....
Id. The text the Briggs initiative replaced was more narrow.
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27
Selection bias confounds the quantitative analysis of court opinions.
California death penalty appeals are free from selection bias because the
California Supreme Court automatically reviews every imposition of the
includes reviews of trials
death penalty. Indeed, this sample of opinions
28
of defendants who seek the death penalty.
An issue that must precede this analysis regards the confidence in a
statistical study of justices' votes regarding the propriety of imposing the
death penalty. One might be concerned that features of the crime may
influence courts and therefore the observed changes of judges' votes may
have other causes, such as a changed crime rate. California appellate
courts, as do most American appellate courts, review the application of
29 Whereas
the legal, rather than factual, conclusions of the trial court.
27 The accumulating research on selection bias in judicial opinions has the "Priest/Klein
hypothesis" as its milestone. Professors Priest and Klein hypothesized that the effect of settlements would be symmetrical, so that the observed "win rate" would tend to be 50%. Subsequent research has found deviations from the predicted 50% win rate. See generally George
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LECAL STUD. 1 (1984).
Others, however, have observed deviations from the hypothesis. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman,
Which Cases Go to Trial?: An EmpiricalStudy of Predictorsof Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 315 (1999) (finding biases in tax litigation and settlements); Peter Siegelman &
Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the
Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 130 (1999) (studying over 20,000 cases; "document[ing] that litigation outcomes (adjudication and plaintiff win rates) vary substantially
The Selection of Employment
across case types"); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III,
Discrimination Disputesfor Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995) (finding and predicting sensitivity of employment
litigation to the business cycle); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991)
(studying 529 jury trials and the corresponding settlement negotiations, finding that the PriestKlein hypothesis is "inconsistent with actual settlement negotiations and trial outcomes");
Gregory Todd Jones, Note, Testing for Structural Change in Legal Doctrine: An Empirical
Look At the Plaintiff's Decision to Litigate Employment Disputes DecadeAfter the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997 (2002) (confirming the predictions of Donohue &
Siegelman); cf Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation, 25 J.LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996)
(attempting to reconcile the observed deviations from the 50% win rate with the Priest-Klein
hypothesis).
28 People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620 (1985) (ruling that the acceptance of a guilty plea in

capital case is improper, even with consent of counsel); see also People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d
739 (1981) (ruling that the acceptance of guilty plea in capital case is improper without agreement of counsel).
29 People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 905-06, reh'g denied 1991 Cal LEXIS 5622, stay
granted 1992 Cal LEXIS 682, cert. denied 505 U.S. 1224 (1992) (refusing to review the
sufficiency of the evidence for proof beyond reasonable doubt and limiting review to the existence of evidence, noting that "[t]he relevant inquiry on appeal is whether 'any rational trier of
fact' could have been.., persuaded [beyond reasonable doubt]") quoting People v. Lucero, 44
Cal. 3d 1006, 1020 (1988), (emphasis in original); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. City & County of
San Francisco, 782 P.2d 278, 281 (1989) ("If the pertinent inquiry requires application of
experience with human affairs, the question is predominantly factual and its determination is
reviewed under the substantial-evidence test. If, by contrast, the inquiry requires a critical
consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values, the question
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the nature of the crimes committed by defendants or public sentiment
may arguably influence the findings of a trial court, those findings of fact
are reviewed by an appellate court, minimizing the potential for extraneous influences. Events such as crime waves or a crack epidemic might
influence triers of fact, for example. The result may be that the burden of
proof for conviction on given evidence appears easier to meet. Appellate
review of the convictions, however, would not review such conclusions.30 Thus, it is reasonable to start from the hypothesis that the rate of
affirming death penalties does not depend on socioeconomic
circumstances.
The sample consists of the opinions of the California Supreme
Court that review the imposition of the death penalty in 1984, 1985,
1989, and 1990. These years are sufficiently far removed from the election so as not to be disrupted by transitional effects. They were collected
from LEXIS by searching in the database of California opinions for opinions of the Supreme Court during those years that mention "death penalty."'3 1 Their thrust is captured in the following figure.
FIGURE 1: DEATH PENALTY VOTES
Pre-Election

Post-Election

affirm

reverse
0

L0

affirm

reverse

Decisions of the Court

11

[

4

J. Broussard

L~

16

2

J. Mosk
J. Lucas

8

0

C. J. Bird / J. Eagleson

9

J. Grodin / K., A.

9

2

J. Kaus/J.Kennard

6

4

0

J. Reynoso /J. Panelli

8

44

38

All in aggregate

L

,0

4

3'

2

This table compares the death penalty decisions from 1984-85 to
those from 1989-90. The two time periods form two panels, one on each
side of the names of the judges. The reversing and affirming votes of
each period form a bar graph. The gray bars that extend to the left correspond to reversal votes and the black bars that extend to the right to
affirming votes. The first row corresponds to the entire court and is labeled "Decisions of the Court." It reviewed 33 death penalty cases from
is predominantly legal and its determination is reviewed independently."). See also Appellate
Review, 5 AM. JUR. 2d §§ 695 et seq. (2003).
30 Id.

31 The "command search" used is "states; cacts; 'death penalty' and court(supreme) and
date=19-."
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1984-85 and 52 from 1989-90. The next seven rows correspond to each
justice. The three justices on the court during both periods occupy the
first three rows (Broussard, Mosk, and Lucas, in the order they are discussed below). The next four rows hold the votes of different justices in
the two periods. A slash separates the pre-election justice from the postelection justice of the same row. For example, the row "C.J. Bird / J.
Eagleson" holds the voting record of Chief Justice Rose Bird during
1984-85 and that of Justice Eagleson during 1989.32 The last row, labeled "All in aggregate", holds the aggregation of the individual justices'
votes. The chief justice during 1989-90 is Lucas. The regular justices'
votes aggregate to 337.
The pre-election sample from 1984 and 1985 reveals a court that is
reluctant to impose the death penalty. The 33 opinions of the sample
34
Of
consist of 10 death penalty cases from 198433 and 23 from 1985.
these, none affirm the penalty. The seven regular justices in 1984-1985
are Bird, Broussard, Grodin, Kaus, Lucas, Mosk, and Reynoso. In aggre35
gate, 215 votes were cast by the regular justices in 1984-1985. Bird,
Broussard and Reynoso never vote to affirm a death penalty. Kaus casts
32 The table fails to indicate two changes in each period. Justice Kaufman left the Court
during 1990 and Justice Arabian was appointed to the Court that year. Their voting record is
in the fourth row, marked "Pre: Grodin; Post: K., A."
33 The search finds 15 cases from 1984, of which 5 drop out because they do not involve
review of the imposition of the death penalty. Included in the 1984 sample are People v.
Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731 (1984); People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal. 3d 573 (1984); People v. Holt,
37 Cal. 3d 436 (1984); People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302 (1984); People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d
136 (1984); People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724 (1984); People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604 (1984);
People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539 (1984); People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163 (1984); and
People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36 (1984). Excluded from the 1984 sample are Williams v.
Superior Ct., 36 Cal. 3d 441 (1984); Corenevsky v. Superior Ct., 36 Cal. 3d 307 (1984);
People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154 (1984); People v. March, 36 Cal. 3d 134 (1984); and
People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824 (1984).
34 The search returned 29 cases from 1985, of which 6 are not relevant because the court
does not review the imposition of the death penalty. Included in the 1985 sample are People v.
Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 658 (1985); People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711 (1985); People v. Boyd, 38
Cal. 3d 762 (1985); People v. Hayes, 38 Cal. 3d 780 (1985); People v. Anderson, 38 Cal. 3d
58 (1985); People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1 (1985); People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29 (1985);
People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92 (1985); People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116 (1985); People v.
Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 211 (1985); People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247 (1985); People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296 (1985); People v. Lucky, 41
Cal. 3d 315 (1985); People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d
408 (1985); People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629
(1985); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512 (1985); People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377 (1985);
People v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910 (1985); People v. Frierson, 39 Cal. 3d 803 (1985); and
People v. Chavez, 39 Cal. 3d 823 (1985). Excluded from the 1985 sample are Pollack v.
DMV, 38 Cal. 3d 367 (1985); People v. Coleman, 38 Cal. 3d 69 (1985); People v. Fritz, 40
Cal. 3d 227 (1985); Green v. Superior Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 126 (1985); People v. Weidert, 39 Cal.
3d 836 (1985); and People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667 (1985).
35 Justices Broussard, Kaus, and Mosk voted on all 33 cases. Reynoso, Grodin and Bird
each did not vote on one case. Lucas, who was appointed in 1984, voted on 20.
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two affirming votes out of 33 for a 6% ratio of affirming votes. 36 Grodin
casts six affirming votes, or 18%. Mosk casts 16 affirming votes, or
48%. Lucas, who is appointed in 1984, casts 14 affirming votes out of
20, or 70%.
The opinions after the elections present a very different image. The
52 opinions of the post-election sample consist of 26 death penalty cases
from 198937 and 26 from 1990.38 Of the 52 cases in 1989-90 the death
penalty is affirmed in 41, or 79%. To the extent that the electorate intended to produce a court that would uphold the death penalty often, it
succeeded. The electorate managed to increase death penalty affirmances from 0 to 79%.
The post-election sample also has more death penalty opinions. Did
the elections also lead to this result? A superficial statistical analysis
36 The only votes by Kaus affirming the death penalty in the sample are in People v.
Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36 (1984); and People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711 (1985). Kaus was in the
minority in these cases, and Lucas had not yet joined the court.
37 The same search as in note 31 above, with the necessary date adjustment, was used.
The search finds 27 cases from 1989, of which one drops out because it does not involve
review of the imposition of the death penalty. Included in the 1989 sample are People v.
Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170 (1989); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d 957 (1989); People v. Lang, 49
Cal. 3d 991 (1989); People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502 (1989); People v. Carrera, 49 Cal.3d 291
(1989); People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200 (1989); People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142
(1989); People v. Bloom, 48 Cal. 3d 1194 (1989); People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046 (1989);
People v. Williams, 48 Cal. 3d 1112 (1989); People v. Murtisaw, 48 Cal. 3d 1001 (1989);
People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935 (1989); People v. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d 879 (1989); People v.
Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843 (1989); People v. Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d 757 (1989); People v. Morales,
48 Cal. 3d 527 (1989); People v. Boyer, 48 Cal. 3d 247 (1989); People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d
112 (1989); People v. Wright, 48 Cal. 3d 168 (1989); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194
(1989); People v. Robertson, 48 Cal. 3d 18 (1989); People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047 (1989);
People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983 (1989); People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888 (1989); People
v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808 (1989); and People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746 (1989). The sample
from 1989 excludes Frank v. Superior Ct., 48 Cal. 3d 632 (1989).
38 The same search as in note 31 above, with the necessary date adjustment, was used.
The search returned results for 30 cases from 1990, of which four are irrelevant because the
court did not review the imposition of the death penalty. Included in the 1990 sample are
People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal. 3d 648 (1990); People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577 (1990); People v.
Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754 (1990); People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719 (1990); People v. Anderson,
52 Cal. 3d 453 (1990); People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367 (1990); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d
115 (1990); People v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d 210 (1990): People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179
(1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870 (1990);
People v. Frank, 51 Cal. 3d 718 (1990); People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620 (1990); People v.
Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471 (1990); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72 (1990); People v. Gordon,
50 Cal. 3d 1223 (1990); People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990); People v. Holloway, 50
Cal. 3d 1098 (1990); People v. Miller, 50 Cal. 3d 954 (1990); People v. Marshall, 50 Cal. 3d
907 (1990); People v. Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826 (1990); People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668
(1990); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468 (1990);
People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262 (1990); and People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134 (1990). The
sample from 1990 excludes Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990); Curl v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. 3d 1292 (1990); In re Fields, 51 Cal. 3d 1063 (1990); and Gadda v. State Bar of
California, 50 Cal. 3d 344 (1990).
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answers this question in the affirmative. Closer investigation reveals a
richer picture.
Each year, the court issues a number of death penalty opinions. If
after the elections the court tends to issue more opinions, the statistical
support for change would be a rejection of the hypothesis that the court
tends to issue the same number of opinions. The corresponding statistical test is the t-test and using it to compare 1980-86 to 1987-2003 produces significant results. The t-test indicates that, if the court's tendency
had not changed, the observed difference would occur by chance with a
probability of 1.3%. In terms of "statistical confidence" this means a
98.7% confidence that the post-election court's tendency increased to is39
sue more opinions.
As we will see again, the statistical conclusion turns out to be facile.
A picture is worth a thousand words, and a graph is worth more than one
statistical test. The statistical test ignores the richness that may be immediately apparent in a graph of the data. The following table shows the
number of the California Supreme Court opinions regarding the death
penalty in the years from 1980 to 2003.40
FIGURE 2: THE NUMBER OF DEATH PENALTY OPINIONS,
1980-2003
50

40

30

20

10

1985
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1995

2000

39 From 1980 to 1986 the court issued, on average, 14 death penalty opinions per year,
with a standard deviation of 7.42 and a count of 7 years. From 1987 to 2003, the court averaged 23.6 death penalty opinions per year, with a standard deviation of 12.3 and a count of 12
years. Books on introductory statistics discuss the "t-test." See, e.g., DAVID FREEDMAN ET
AL., STATIsTIcs 490-95 (3rd ed. 1998).
40 The searches were the same as described in note 31, above, with some opinions excluded for each year's search because they did not review the death penalty. The data underlying the table are '80: 9 opinions; '81: 7 ops.; '82: 16 ops.; '83: 13 ops.; '84: 15 ops.; '85: 29
ops.; '86: 9 ops.; '87: 12 ops.; '88: 56 ops.; '89: 26 ops.; '90: 26 ops.; '91: 29 ops.; '92: 41
ops.; '93: 26 ops.; '94: 14 ops.; '95: 20 ops.; '96: 18 ops.; '97: 18 ops.; '98: 22 ops.; '99: 10
ops.; '00: 23 ops.; '01: 16 ops.; '02: 21 ops.; '03: 23 ops.
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Would one conclude from this graph that the post-election court issued death penalty opinions at a faster rate? An affirmative answer to
that question would require a graph of two constant states. The pre-election court would tend to produce opinions close to one number; the postelection court would tend to produce them close to a greater number.
Rather than two constant states, the graph suggests an increasing trend
before elections and a steady state after 1992. The years from 1987 to
1992 are different; they can fit into several theories.
The appearance of an increasing trend before the elections is not
surprising. After the death penalty was reinstated in 1978, 4 1 not all cases
reached the California Supreme Court with the same speed. Even if the
same number of capital sentences were imposed every year, only the
exceptionally fast ones would reach the Supreme Court within one year.
The number of opinions during an initial, transitional period would be
increasing. This does not explain, however, the number of opinions from
1987 to 1992. If the post-election court reviewed more capital sentences,
one would expect a permanent increase, but the apparent constancy of
the number of opinions after 1992 contradicts that hypothesis. The puzzles remain.
A closer look at the opinions, beyond the raw statistical data,
reveals the answer. Justice Lucas reported that 170 death penalty appeals
were pending before the California Supreme Court in late 1985.42 The
post-election court seemed to consider the cure of this particular backlog
more approachable than the pre-election court did. Dealing with a backlog suggests increased production of opinions for a few years. After the
backlog was cleared, the California Supreme Court returned to a normal
number of opinions. After all, the supreme court can review only the
number of death penalties imposed by the trial courts.
Allen E. Broussard, Stanley Mosk and Malcolm M. Lucas are the
justices who were on the California Supreme Court both before and after
the 1986 election. The first issue is whether their voting records in 198990 were consistent with their voting records in 1984-85. The next section examines the three justices in turn.
II.

CONSISTENCY BETWEEN 1984 AND 1989

After the 1986 election, the court followed a vastly different voting
pattern. This is not at all surprising. What changes should be expected
from the Justices who did remain on the court? Since they were the same
individuals, one could expect them to exhibit some consistency. Should
41 See Schatz & Rivkind, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42 People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 546-47 (1985) (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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a justice who was always satisfied with the procedure followed in death
penalty trials in 1984-85, find errors in 1989? Could a justice who never
found the trial procedure adequate in 1984-85, be expected to approve
the procedure of over a fifth of the cases in 1989? Yet, both phenomena
appear.
Each one of the voting records of the three justices justifies a closer
look by revealing texture that a simple count hides. The exposition will
start with the only judge that changed his votes in the same direction as
the court, Justice Broussard. We will proceed to the judge who appeared
most responsive to the electorate's incentives, Justice Mosk, and will finally examine the attitudes of Justice Lucas, who was the Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court in 1989.
A.

JUSTICE BROUSSARD

Justice Broussard voted with the court during the 1984-85 session.
During that period, the California Supreme Court never affirmed a death
penalty and neither did Broussard. When circumstances changed, Broussard also changed his standard, though not enough to match the new
court. In 1989-90, the court affirmed 79% of the death penalty convictions it reviewed, while Justice Broussard voted to affirm only about
40% of the capital sentences.
A different way to quantify Justice Broussard's attitudes in death
penalty reviews is to ask how often he agreed with the court. In 1984-85,
he agreed with the court in all of the cases. By contrast, in 1989-90,
Justice Broussard disagreed in twenty cases, or 38% of the time. Not
surprisingly, Justice Broussard never voted to affirm a death penalty sentence in the eleven cases where the court reversed the sentence. Nevertheless, Broussard did vote with the post-election Court to affirm twentyone death sentences, which is puzzling. His re-election was not approaching (he would have been up for re-election in 1994 but retired
prior to that). He never wrote a separate concurring opinion to affirm a
death sentence. In four cases, Justice Broussard joined a concurring
opinion to affirm of Justice Mosk, in which a more lenient stance than
that of the court was articulated. 43 Cleary, Justice Broussard did not
agree with the post-election Court's attitudes. Still, his dissents were
very civil and nonconfrontational.
In one example, the majority found that not instructing the jury on a
lesser but likelier offense of theft, rather than burglary, did not harm the
defendant. Justice Broussard's dissent argued that theft was the more
likely offense and that its absence led the jury to convict the defendent of
43 People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453, 485-86 (1990); People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931,
972-74 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468, 541-42 (1990); People v. Jackson, 49 Cal.
3d 1170, 1209-11 (1989).
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the more serious charge of burglary, which unlike theft, was an offense
that could lead to the death penalty."4 Justice Broussard's sharpest prose
was limited to pointing out a contradiction in the majority's argument
that the jury's finding of burglary cured the error:
It is simply not logical to use the products of the error to
dispel the prejudice arising from the error, as the major45
ity does.
The identification of contradictions in criminal procedure does not
lend itself to gripping rhetoric. Examples of Justice Broussard's aggressive stances tend to be complex. Their strength lies in logic, rather than
brevity:
The majority, however, declare that even though the
state is withholding potentially exculpatory evidence, the
limited scope and pleading requirements of habeas
corpus prevent defendant from ...discovering the concealed evidence .... [I]t seems appropriate to quote a
court with a different perspective on the scope of habeas
corpus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action .... ,,46
Whereas someone without Justice Broussard's demeanor would
have used the last quote from the United States Supreme Court to drive
home his point, Justice Broussard let understatement carry his message.
The reader initially senses a pointless comparison, that a different court
holds the differing view that habeas corpus protects defendants against
lawless states. Closer inspection reveals that the different court happens
to be the United States Supreme Court. The reader does not hear from
Justice Broussard that California's enforcement authorities have crossed
the boundary of lawlessness and that its Supreme Court denies defendants protections that they would receive in federal courts.
Justice Broussard's refusal to take a confrontational stance either in
his votes or his text is remarkable. Such civility certainly corresponds to
the ideal of the dispassionate judge. A focus on incentives, however,
would require an inquiry into whether accommodating the majority produces a benefit. Going along with the majority creates good will that
Broussard could use in other instances, or, by agreeing with the majority,
he could influence the writing of the majority opinion so that it might
take a more lenient tone than if he had stayed in the minority. Indeed, he
44 People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 721-26 (1990).
45 Id. at 726.
46 People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1290 (1990) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 290-92 (1969)).
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does write one affirming opinion for the majority in a case where Justice
47
Mosk, who usually joins Justice Broussard in dissent, dissents alone.
Compared to the voting records of Justices Mosk and Lucas, Broussard's record is the one most amenable to statistical analysis. Such analysis suggests that Justice Broussard's voting cannot be reconciled with
individual consistency, commitment to his political party, or changes in
the law.
The voting patterns of Justice Broussard do not exhibit any individual consistency. Justice Broussard would be consistent if his voting did
not change over time. Given that his voting did change, he would be
consistent only if this change could be explained by chance. The statistical method known as x -test calculates that probability, which in this case
48
is minimal.
The scholarly analysis of judicial voting focuses on the role of political parties in judicial voting patterns. 49 As Justice Broussard's voting
record clearly places him on the left end of the ideological spectrum, the
issue is to examine how the position of the left-leaning Democratic party
on the death penalty changed from 1985 to 1989. The change is undeniable, exemplified in the passage of the Federal Death Penalty Act of
199450 under Democratic leadership. 5' Assuming that the Democratic
party ceased to oppose the death penalty, a hypothesis can be formed
about why Justice Broussard could be expected to change his voting. If
by joining the majority Justice Broussard could obtain a benefit, either in
the form of good-will or in the form of authoring a less severe opinion,
then the testable hypothesis becomes whether Justice Broussard votes
with the court. However, Justice Broussard often dissented, and his
votes differed significantly from those of either the court or the other
justices. 52 He did not follow the court, despite the fact that he did so
more than if he had maintained his pre-election stance of never affirming
a death penalty.
47 People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990).
48 Applying the test to compare Justice Broussard's votes either before or after the election produces a probability of 0.5%. The X2-test is explained in DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL.,

STATfSTIcs 537-40 (3rd ed. 1998) (using as an example the probability that men may have a
greater tendency to be left-handed).
49 See supra notes 3-8.

50 This statute was enacted as an internal part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 18 of United States Code).
51 See Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politicsof Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 passim
(1996) (discussing the interaction of the parties leading to the passage of the act).
52 See supra note 48. Applying the x2-test produces the probability that chance explains
the difference between Justice Broussard's voting and that of the other justices on the court,
both of which are under 0.0001%.
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A third hypothesis that might explain Broussard's votes is that they
track changes in the law. The relevant law for our sample is the criminal
procedure of capital trials in California. One important change was the
reversal by the Lucas court of a rule formed by the Bird court. The Bird
court held that a jury must find intent to kill in the offense which constitutes the "special circumstance" that produces eligibility for the death
penalty. 5 3 In other words, if the special circumstance offense is arson, in
the commission of which the defendant murdered the victim, the jury
must find that the arson was intended for the purpose of murder. The
Lucas court reversed that interpretation and affirmed capital sentences of
defendants who did not intend to kill with the special circumstance offense. 54 Although Justice Broussard's voting record might seem to indicate that it tracked changes in the law, when a slightly different fact
pattern arises, he dissents and points out paradoxes:
[I]t is irrational to hold this defendant is subject to the
death penalty because he initially intended to set a fire to
drive the victim from the house and then shoot him,
when a defendant who from the beginning intended to
burn the victim to death in the conflagration would not
be subject to the death penalty, and neither would a defendant who planned to shoot the victim first and then
burn down the house to conceal the murder. The death
penalty should not turn on such a narrow, technical and
insignificant distinction as that invoked as a basis for the
55
majority opinion.
Justice Broussard refuses to acquiesce in an affirming opinion he
deems irrational. Despite that the number of his votes affirming the
death penalty indicate a change parallel to the change in law, a closer
look resists that explanation.
In sum, Justice Broussard changes his voting, refuting self-consistency. His change is too small, however, for a pure explanation on the
basis of party affiliation and, although the change is consistent with an
intervening change in the law, it is also in tension with that explanation.
Justice Broussard seems to reluctantly take an accommodating stance in
the Lucas court, which is not easily explained. This question is particularly interesting if we contrast Justice Lucas' accommodating period
before the elections. Given the attitudes of the electorate, Justice Lucas'
53 See People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724 (1984); Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131
(1983).
54 See People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138-39 (1987).
55 People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 643-44 (1990) (in the omitted footnote, Justice Broussard adds "it is absurd for a defendant who kills unintentionally to be subject to the death
punishment").
penalty when a defendant who intended to kill is ineligible f
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abandonment of his conciliatory stance for confrontation proved effective. The political reality was that Broussard could not expect such a
reward for confrontation. He was choosing a middle line between his
individual sense of justice and collegial accommodation that frustrates
statistical analysis.
B.

JUSTICE MOSK

Contrary to Justice Broussard, who changed his voting in the direction of the court, Justice Mosk made no such concessions. In the 19841985 court, he was the second most affirming judge of the death penalty,
after Justice Lucas. Justice Mosk cast affirming votes in 48% of death
penalty cases.
On the 1989-90 court, Justice Mosk's votes to affirm death penalties
became increasingly scarce, since he affirmed only 40% of cases involving the death penalty in that period. Contrary to their differences in
1984-1985 when Justice Mosk was affirming more often than the neveraffirming Justice Broussard, in 1989, Justice Mosk affirmed death penalty cases at the same rate as Broussard. The reduction of Mosk's affirmance record is not statistically significant. Yet, in both periods,
Justice Mosk's record also differs significantly from that of the Court.
The contrarian strategy of Justice Mosk is not easy to justify. Frequent disagreements are bound to erode a judge's good will among colleagues and surrender power to influence the majority's opinions. A
closer look reveals that Justice Mosk's disagreements produces opportunities to write dissenting opinions.
In 1989-90, Justice Mosk agreed with Justice Broussard 48 times
out of 52 cases. In 29 cases, they agreed to reverse the lower court's
imposition of the death penalty. In 18 of these reversals they disagreed
with the majority of the court. Only in two cases did Justice Mosk vote
to reverse without the agreement of Justice Broussard. 56 Justice Mosk
wrote eight of their joint dissents, 57 while Justice Broussard wrote two.5

8

separately. 59

Eight more times they both dissented and wrote
Thus, Justice Mosk wrote 16 opinions in the 18 death penalty cases in which he
56 People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200 (1989); People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158
(1990).
57 People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367 (1990); People v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d 210 (1990);
People v. Bloom, 48 Cal. 3d 1194 (1989); People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935 (1989); People v.
Allison, 48 Cal. 3d 879 (1989); People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527 (1989); People v. Johnson,
47 Cal. 3d 1194 (1989); People v. Robertson, 48 Cal. 3d 18 (1989).
58 People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668 (1990); People v. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843 (1989).
59 People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179 (1990); People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870 (1990);
People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620 (1990); People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471 (1990); People v.
Mattson, 50 Cal. 3d 826 (1990); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583 (1990); People v. Bell, 49
Cal. 3d 502 (1989); People v. Murtisaw, 48 Cal. 3d 1001 (1989).
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dissented. When they both agreed with the court, Justice Mosk wrote six
concurring opinions that Broussard joined, 60 while Mosk only joined in
one concurring opinion authored by Broussard. 6 1 Mosk disagreed with
Broussard twice to write a dissent,62 one while Broussard wrote for the
63
court,
and he wrote six concurring opinions without Broussard, five of
which affirmed the death penalty. 64 Broussard wrote a dissent in one of
those cases. 6 5 Clearly, Justice Mosk wrote a disproportionate share of
the dissenting and concurring opinions in 1989-90.
The picture in 1984-1985 is somewhat different, but again Justice
Mosk produced a disproportionate number of dissenting and concurring
opinions. Although Justice Lucas agreed with Justice Mosk in 9 dissents6 6 (all affirming the death penalty), of the 15 times they agreed, they

often disagreed in their rationale. Lucas and Mosk dissented separately
in six cases, 67 with Lucas joining Mosk in one, 68 both joining Grodin in
one, 69 and with Mosk joining Lucas in one. 70 Mosk dissented alone in
five cases, 7 1 in one additional dissent he was joined by Grodin, 72 and in
one he joined Grodin. 73 All told, Mosk wrote 13 dissenting opinions out
of the 16 cases in which he dissented. Mosk also wrote one concurring
75
opinion74 and joined in a concurring opinion of Chief Justice Bird.
60 People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931 (1990); People v. Douglas, 50 Cal. 3d 468 (1990);
People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262 (1990); People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170 (1989); People v.
Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991 (1989); People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983 (1989).
61 People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746 (1989).
62 People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990); People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200
(1989).
63 People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990).
64 People v. Taylor, 52 Cal. 3d 719 (1990); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115 (1990);
People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72 (1990); People v. Carrera, 49 Cal. 3d 291 (1989); People
v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142 (1989). The sole opinion where Justice Mosk concurs without
Justice Broussard is People v. Holloway, 50 Cal. 3d 1098 (1990).
65 People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142 (1989).
66 People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1 (1985); People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92 (1985); People v.
Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 211 (1985); People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 408 (1985) People v. Massie, 40
Cal. 3d 620 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629 (1985); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512
(1985).
67 People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1 (1985); People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144 (1985);
People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247 (1985); People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296 (1984);
People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 408 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629 (1985).
68 People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92 (1985).
69 People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 211 (1985).
70 People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620 (1985).
71 People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604 (1984); People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163 (1984);
People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36 (1984); People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247 (1985); People v.
Frierson, 39 Cal. 3d 803 (1985).
72 People v. Memro, 38 Cal. 3d 658 (1985).
73 People v. Lucky, 41 Cal. 3d 315 (1985).
74 People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436 (1984).
75 People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539 (1984).
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Even without having someone join in his dissents as consistently as
Broussard did in 1989-90, Justice Mosk already had written many opinions in 1984-1985. Whereas Broussard's appeasement may have sought
his colleagues' good will, it seems Mosk's writing seeks the esteem of
the legal profession generally.
A recent study of judicial incentives labels judges who seek citations "superstars" and surmises they are few:
[Tihe market for opinions (or, more accurately, the market for citations) will be dominated by a few superstars. .

.

. [I]if a few judges write opinions that are

better... in enough different areas, only the opinions of
these judges will be cited. In addition, there is a skew at
the outset. There are a handful of judges who far exceed
the others .... 76
The paucity of superstars, argue Professors Bainbridge and Gulati,
induces other judges to use shortcuts to reduce their authorship load.
They distinguish their position from this author's argument that common
law judges have a stronger incentive to pursue prestige than civil law
judges.77 Justice Mosk, however, stands as a vivid counter-example to
this hypothesis. Mosk was appointed to the Court in September 1964.78
By 1989 he had spent 25 years on the bench. His attaining membership
in the "superstar" group was virtually impossible. A search of the pre1989 collection of articles on the LEXIS database produces 85 articles
referring to Mosk. 79 This is a far cry from the true superstar of the California Supreme Court, Justice Traynor, who is cited by 211 pre-1989
articles, or Rose Bird, a search of whose name returns 98 citations. Justice Tobriner, retired since 1981, attracted 53, and Justice Richardson,
retired since 1983, attracted 45 citations. 80 Broussard attracted 12 cita76 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 6. at 108-09.
77 Cf id. at 108 n.81 ("In contrast to us, Nicholas Georgakopoulos argues that judges in
the U.S. system are likely to pursue prestige through the process of opinion writing and specifically through the acquisition of citations."); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Independence in the
Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE 205, 212-13 (2000) (comparing
the incentives of judges in career-oriented systems and recognition based systems like the
federal judiciary; noting that judges may "either ...

shirk their judicial work or ...

use their

judicial work to enhance their welfare" but also surmising that "judges in recognition systems
may be sufficiently induced not to shirk.").
78 Supreme Court of California, Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court 56, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/documents/
supreme2003-2.pdf (July 17, 2002).
79 Produced by the command search "2ndary; allrev; ("stanley mosk" or "mosk, stanley") and date(bef 1989)." Some searches produced a handful of articles that did not apply to
the appropriate judge; those have been dropped from the counts.
80 See Supreme Court of California, supra note 80, at 56 available at http://
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/documents/supreme2003-2.pdf. Mathew Oscar Tobri-
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tions, and Lucas attracted 20. Mosk is third on this list despite lengthy
service. In 1989, he must have known that more opinions would not
produce a citation count that would overtake Traynor's. Despite the impossibility of achieving the status of "superstar," Mosk wrote tirelessly.
A more sinister explanation of Justice Mosk's high affirmance rate
before his 1986 re-election might be that he sought to appease the electorate's preference for the affirmation of cases where the death penalty was
imposed. The comparison does not reach statistical significance. It is
interesting to note, however, that the change in the law after the election
works against the statistical test. Since the law became more forgiving
of trial error, the 40% affirming rate of Mosk on the Lucas court may be
partly explained by the change in the law. Furthermore, Mosk's affirming rate from 1981-82 can be used as one more benchmark. In that
period he voted to affirm twice 8' and to reverse seven times,8 2 for an
affirmance rate of 22%. This lends some credence to the notion that his
pre-election affirmance rate was high but the setting defies statistical
validation.
In sum, Justice Mosk was extraordinarily motivated in writing opinions, despite that he could not reach the status of a superstar judge. He
might also have been responding to the preferences of the electorate prior
to his re-election.
C.

JUSTICE LUCAS

Immediately following his 1984 appointment to the court, Justice
Lucas' first votes were in agreement with the Court. Soon thereafter,
however Justice Lucas turned into a consistent dissenter. In 1989-90, as
the Chief Justice, he still affirmed more death penalty convictions than
the entire Court, but affirmed less frequently than in 1989-90.
In 1984, Justice Lucas participated in four death penalty cases and
he affirmed only once.8 3 In 1985 he stated that he disagreed with the
precedent from 1983 and 1984 which forced the reversal of all cases
where: (1) the intentional murder took place during a crime that is a
special circumstance according to § 190.2 of the California Penal Code,
but where the jury was not instructed that the "special circumstance"
crime had to be undertaken with the intent to murder; 84 and (2) there was
ner served from July 1962 to January 1982; Frank K. Richardson served from December 1974
to December 1983.

81 People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21 (1982); People v. Easley, 33 Cal. 3d 65 (1982).
82 People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553 (1982); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841 (1982);

People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815 (1982); People v. Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d 80 (1982); People v.
Gzikowski, 32 Cal. 3d 580 (1982); People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739 (1982); People v. Harris,
28 Cal. 3d 935 (1982); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733 (1982).
83 People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724 (1984).
84 See id.
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a mention to the jury of the governor's power to commute life
sentences. 85 Lucas dissented in his first death penalty case, People v.
Whitt,86 on August 27, 1984. He voted to affirm the death penalty where
the jury was not instructed that the "special circumstance" offence-a
robbery, in the commission of which a murder took place-had to include intent to kill:
I am convinced by the analysis contained in Justice
Richardson's dissent in [Carlos] that . . . neither the
framers of nor the voters for the 1978 death penalty initiative contemplated the new law would require proof of
an intent to kill in a felony-murder situation... Believing as I do that Carlos was incorrectly decided, a fortiori, I would not apply that case retroactively to all cases
pending on appeal [as required by People v. Garcia, 36
Cal. 3d 539 (1984)].87
With this statement, the relation between Justice Lucas and the Bird
court became confrontational. He voted with the court to reverse three
death penalty sentences during 1984. In one case, Justice Lucas wrote a
concurring opinion referring to his dissent in Whitt, increasing his distance from the other justices on the court. 88 Nevertheless, Lucas felt
bound by precedent and voted to reverse the death penalty conviction.
The same concurrence, under compulsion of precedent that he faulted,
appeared in his first and second death penalty decisions in 1985.89 He
soon took a more active stance. In an opinion on November 18, 1985, he
dissented, stating:
Although I have in the past concurred in reversals of
some capital cases under the compulsion of Carlos/Garcia, I can no longer characterize myself as "concurring"
in these reversals. . . . I would join three of my colleagues in reexamining, and ultimately overruling, those
decisions. 90
With those words, Justice Lucas abandoned attempts at harmony
with the Bird court. He cast ten more votes in 1985, all to affirm the
death penalty. 9'
People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136 (1984) (Lucas, J., concurring).
36 Cal. 3d at 749.
87 Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d at 749-50 (1984) (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations
omitted).
88 People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 159-160 (1984).
89 People v. Anderson, 38 Cal. 3d 58, 62-3 (1985); People v. Hayes, 38 Cal. 3d 780, 788
(1985).
90 People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 390 (1985) (citations omitted).
91 People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 546 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 642
(1985); People v. Massie, 40 Cal. 3d 620, 626 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 408, 437
85

86
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In 1989-90, Justice Lucas, rather than casting minority votes to affirm, was Chief Justice of a court that affirmed 79% of the death penalty
sentences it reviewed. The court over which Lucas presided had eroded
the principles that he opposed on the Bird court. The Carlos and Garcia
holdings were reversed. 92 The mention of the governor's power to commute life sentences no longer led to per se reversal. 93 Despite the high
proportion of decisions affirming the death penalty in 1989-90, Chief
Justice Lucas voted to affirm three more death penalties than the rest of
the court. 94 He wrote a dissent from one reversal 95 and joined dissents in
the other two. 96 In one affirming opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion
97
in order to avoid review by the United States Supreme Court.
In sum, the voting patterns of Justice Lucas show that in 1984-85 he
attempted to follow the court, then abandoned that stance to confront the
court, and finally, in 1989, led the court in affirming death sentences.
Justice Lucas' votes, however, like those of Broussard and Mosk, do not
yield to statistical analysis. Strategic action is revealed by exploring the
totality of the circumstances, not only voting but also items such as the
text of each judge's opinions, and the frequency of his dissents. This is
an important message for any quantitative study of judges. The exercise
of the judicial function leads naturally and inescapably to strategic action
that may not be visible in the voting record.
III.

JUDICIAL TENURES

The consequences of the 1986 election must be studied more closely
because they are important in evaluating judicial elections. A complete
evaluation of such a complex institution is impossible here. The 1986
elections are particularly conducive to the study of one aspect of this
institution, the tension between judicial independence and accountability.
The events of the 1986 California judicial elections can also be rephrased in terms of independence and accountability. The Court's refusal to impose the death penalty was an exercise of its independence.
Accountability was achieved through the removal of three justices.
(1985); People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 370 (1985); People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal. 3d 296,
313-314 (1985); People v. Hamilton, 41 Cal. 3d 211 (1985); People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d
144, 206-208 (1985); People v. Leach, 41 Cal. 3d 92, 112 (1985); People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d
1, 25-26 (1985).
92 See People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138-39 (1987).
93 See, e.g. Hamilton, 45 Cal. 3d at 375 (holding that, despite the impropriety of mentioning the governor's power to commute sentences during jury instruction, its mention was
not prejudicial error).
94 People v. Wright, 48 Cal. 3d 168 (1989); People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983 (1989);
People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888 (1989).
95 Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d at 1043.
96 People v. Wright, 48 Cal. 3d 168 (1989); Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d at 936.
97 See People v. Bloom, 48 Cal. 3d 1194, 1232-1234 (1989) (Lucas, J., concurring).

2004]

JUDICIAL REACTION TO CHANGE

The California Constitution gives to the electorate the power to hold
justices accountable by removing them. This constitutional power does
not exist in jurisdictions where the judiciary has life tenure. Jurisdictions
that elect judges in contested elections also confer to their electorate this
constitutional power of holding judges accountable, albeit to different
degrees.
It is unnecessary to ascertain the degree to which other systems of
judicial elections confer such a power. It is important to realize that accountability through elections can be analyzed as a continuum. At one
extreme would be systems with contested and very frequent elections; at
the opposite extreme would be an irrevocable life tenure system. California's confirmation elections with long terms are a point in that range.
The level of accountability is part of the background institutional
structure in which a judge's career unfolds. Compare a judgeship that
entails frequent electoral battles to a judgeship with life tenure. Most
jurists would consider that the two careers have significant differences, at
least in that the latter does not involve any campaigning. Retention elections reduce campaigning compared to contested elections. This creates
some similarity to life tenure for judges elected under retention elections.
The risk to the career of judges who have life tenure is less than under
retention elections. Contested elections produce greater risk.
A complete exploration of the effect of career risk on the judiciary
is beyond the scope of this article. Further research may validate a hypothesis that career risk makes the judiciary less appealing to top legal
talent. By contrast, perhaps career risk may act as an incentive, and induce elected judges to be more productive and shirk less.
Judges who were appointed to the California Supreme Court before
the 1986 elections joined a Court that had never suffered removal of any
justice by election. 98 The removals of justices by election in 1986 may
have changed the perceived career risk of the justices and may have
changed the selection criteria for appointing judges to the Court. Such a
change, whether temporary or permanent, may have the consequence of
altering career lengths. If a strong effect is found, further research must
focus on the causal link between the elections and career lengths.
The Court has published the dates of appointment and retirement of
all justices since its inception, allowing for the rigorous study of career
lengths. 99 It is not surprising to observe that the justices that were removed in 1986 had unusually short tenures. Strikingly, the justices who
replaced them and Justice Lucas also had unusually short tenures.
98 See GRODIN, supra

note 14 and accompanying text.

99 The Supreme Court of California, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme (reporting the dates of appointment and retirement by month, the day was obtained
when available from the archives of the Secretary of State of California).
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California has appointed 111 justices. The sample consists of their
career lengths. Ignoring those of the three-member court that existed
until 1863 and those who were removed in 1986 leaves 93 careers.10 0 Of
those, seven correspond to the current court members. The average career duration of the 80 judges appointed before Lucas is 15.6 years with a
standard deviation of 11.2. The average career duration of the 13 justices
appointed since Justice Lucas is 7.4 years with a standard deviation of 4.
Despite the small sample, the t-test' 01 indicates strong statistical confidence in the conclusion that since Lucas careers are shorter. 10 2 The difference can also be illustrated by asking how long the current justices
should stay on the court for the average tenure since Lucas to reach the
pre-election average. All seven Justices must remain on the court until
mid March 2016. By that time they will all have served more than 17
years and be in unusually advanced age.
Again, a figure reveals more texture than a statistical test. A figure
can show how the length of careers changes over time. It may reveal
patterns that are not discernible in raw numbers.
FIGURE 3: TENURE LENGTH OVER TIME
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100 The three-member court that existed from 1849 until 1862 had even longer tenures.
The justices who were removed in 1986 must be excluded in a comparison of career lengths
because the shortness of their careers was extraordinary. The statistical significance of the
comparisons below would be even greater if the three-member court was included in the preelection group and the removed justices in the other group. The pre-election sample aggregates the three periods served by Justice Jackson Temple into a single period.
101 See supra note 39.
102 This comparison includes the justices who are still serving on the court and assumes
they serve through 2003. Even if they are excluded, confidence can still be had in the statistical evidence. In both cases, the confidence reaches above the 99.9% level.
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Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the evolution of tenures.
The Justices' tenures are measured along the horizontal axis in years, and
the year of their appointment is on the vertical axis. Each point captures
the year of appointment and the duration of the career of one justice. For
example, consider the point that corresponds to Justice Stanley Mosk.
Going from it down to the duration axis shows that he served about 37
years. Tracing the same point to the year's axis indicates he was appointed in about 1964.
The figure also indicates by name four of the longest-serving justices and traces a line of the running average of career durations. The
calculation of the running average takes into account nineteen careers,
nine before and after each justice. Careers that are more distant receive
diminishing weight. Thus, the running average shows the tendencies of
career durations over time. The longer tenures before the appointment of
Lucas in 1984 are apparent. The figure also reveals, however, that similarly short careers existed before. The justices appointed from 1910 to
1930 seem to also have had short careers.
Statistical analysis cannot indicate the cause of the shortening of
tenures after the appointment of Justice Lucas and from 1910 to 1930. In
both periods, however, a major political change may be at the source of
the short careers. Whereas this Article focused on the death penalty battle on which the 1986 elections turned, the emergence of the welfare
state and the New Deal may be related to the short careers from 1910 to
1930. More research in this area is necessary. It is plausible that Justice
Lucas and those appointed after him were agents of change rather than
long-term judges with a tendency not to remain long on the court. A
successful change may also reduce the appeal of the court for the Justices
who predate the change. A case study of the court in the first half of the
twentieth century would answer some of these questions.
CONCLUSION: IMPOSSIBLE EVALUATIONS?
This Article studied the death penalty votes and opinions of the
three justices that spanned the 1986 elections. Their conduct defies easy
explanation. It remains the conduct of three individuals, whose true
motivations cannot be fully known.
The examination of these three judges reveals three very different,
yet very rich, judicial and political strategies. Justice Broussard demonstrated how a dissenter can work with a majority of the court without
confrontation and perhaps with the hope of some influence. Justice
Mosk is an example of a judge dedicated to the craft of writing opinions,
despite that he cannot attain star status. Justice Lucas' record shows how
a confrontational dissenter may turn into the leader of a new court, if the
political environment is favorable.
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The 1986 elections consummated a major change in policy about
the death penalty. The removal of justices by election was an extraordinary event that may have altered the actual or perceived risk of removal.
Indeed, the lengths of the post-election careers are unusually short. A
similar shortness appeared approximately from about 1910 to 1930. The
large political change at those two times opens the possibility of identifying periods of political change by shortened judicial careers.

